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Abstract
This paper proposes a new identification and estimation approach to semi-parametric
multinomial choice models that easily applies to not only cross-sectional settings but
also panel data settings with unobservable fixed effects. Our approach is based on cyclic
monotonicity, which is a defining feature of the random utility framework underlying
multinomial choice models. From the cyclic monotonicity property, we derive identifying
inequalities without requiring any shape restriction for the distribution of the random
utility shocks. These inequalities point identify model parameters under straightforward
assumptions on the covariates. We propose a consistent estimator based on these in-
equalities, and apply it to a panel data set to study the determinants of the demand of
bathroom tissue.
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1 Introduction
Consider a multinomial choice problem where an agent chooses from K + 1 options
(labelled k = 0, . . . , K). Option k gives the agent indirect utility
β′Xk + k, (1)
where Xk is a dx dimensional vector of observable covariates that has support X , β is
the vector of weights for the covariates in the agent’s utility, and k is an unobservable
utility shock. The agent chooses the option that gives her the highest utility: Y = k ⇔
k ∈ argmaxk=0,...,K
(
β′Xk + k
)
, where Y denotes the multinomial choice indicator.
In this paper, we propose a new semi-parametric approach to the identification and
estimation of β. We exploit the notion of cyclic monotonicity, which is an appropri-
ate generalization of “monotonicity” to multivariate (i.e. vector-valued) functions. We
first show that the cyclic monotonicity property applies to the vector of choice proba-
bilities
{
P (Y = k|X0, . . . , XK)}
k=0,1,...,K
emerging from any multinomial choice model,
when viewed as a function of the vector of linear utility indices (β′X0, . . . , β′XK)′. The
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cyclical monotonicity property implies a collection of of moment inequalities. These mo-
ment inequalities point identify the coefficient β under an appropriate normalization and
straightforward assumptions on the covariates.
Importantly, our approach easily applies to (short) panel data models with fixed
effects. For such models, we consider cyclic monotonicity with respect to cross-time
period cycles, which leads to moment inequalities in which the fixed effects are differenced
out. As reviewed below, this approach is one of the first nonlinear differencing techniques
available for panel multinomial choice models. We then propose a consistent estimator
for β, the computation of which requires only convex optimization.
Several other features of our approach are noteworthy. First, we do not require any
assumption (beyond continuity) on the joint distribution of (0, . . . , K)′. In particular,
this joint distribution needs not be exchangeable with respect to the indices. Second,
in the panel data context, we impose no restriction on the dependence between the
covariates and the fixed effects. Particularly, we do not require the presence of a special
regressor that is conditionally independent of the fixed effects. Finally, the moment
inequalities that we derive apply to both the case of “aggregate data”, in which only
choice frequencies are observed across a large set of markets (this is a common data
structure in the field of empirical industrial organization (IO)), as well as the case of
“individual-level data”, in which choices are observed for individual agents.
As a tradeoff, we assume the independence between the idiosyncratic error and the
covariates. However, this independence can be relaxed when a control variable/function
is available and also can be replaced by some other assumptions that guarantees the
convexity of the social surplus function, as discussed in Section 2 below.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we introduce the notion of cyclic mono-
tonicity and relate it to multinomial choice models. Subsequently, we present the moment
inequalities emerging from cyclic monotonicity, and give assumptions under which these
inequalities suffice to point identify the parameters of interest. Here we present numerical
illustrations of how the identified set of β shrinks as the point identification assumptions
get closer to being satisfied. Section 3 discusses the application to panel data multinomial
choice models, with individual-specific fixed effects. Section 4 discusses estimation and
contains a result about the consistency of our estimator.
The existing literature on multinomial choice models is voluminous, and Section 5
contains a full discussion that relates our approach to the literature. As an empirical
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illustration, we apply our methods to estimate a market-level demand model for toi-
let tissue, using supermarket scanner data. This is discussed in section 6. Section 7
concludes.
2 Cyclic monotonicity and multinomial choice mod-
els
We begin by defining cyclic monotonicity, the central notion of this paper.
Definition 1 (Cyclic Monotonicity). Consider a function f : U → Rm where U ⊆ Rm,
and a length J-cycle of points in Rm: u1, u2, . . . , uJ , u1. The function f is cyclic monotone
with respect to the cycle u1, u2, . . . , uJ , u1 if and only if
J∑
j=1
(uj+1 − uj)′f(uj) ≤ 0, (2)
where uJ+1 = u1. The function f is cyclic monotone on U if it is cyclic monotone with
respect to all possible cycles of all lengths on its domain.1
For real-valued functions defined on a real-space (i.e., m = 1), cyclic monotonicity is
equivalent to monotonicity. In this sense, cyclic monotonicity is one way of generalizing
monotonicity in a vector-valued context. We make use of the following basic result which
relates cyclic monotonicity to convex functions (see e.g, Rockafellar (1970, Ch. 24),
Villani (2003, Sct. 2.3)):
Proposition 1 (Cyclic monotonicity and Convexity). Consider a differentiable function
F : U → R for an open convex set U ⊆ Rm. If F is convex on U , then the gradient of F
(denoted ∇F (u) := ∂F (u)/∂u) is cyclic monotone on U .
Consider a univariate and differentiable convex function; obviously, its slope must be
monotonically nondecreasing. The above result states that cyclic monotonicity is the
appropriate extension of this feature to multivariate convex functions.
Now we connect the above discussion to the multinomial choice model. To convey
the central ideas, we will stay in the cross-sectional setting throughout this section. The
1Technically, the definition defines the property of being “cyclic monotonically increasing,” but for
notational simplicity and without loss of generality, we use “cyclic monotone” for “cyclic monotonically
increasing.”
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results in the cross-sectional setting form the building blocks for the panel setting, which
will be discussed in detail in the next section.
Define Uk = β′Xk, and uk = β′xk for k = 0, 1, . . . , K for a generic realization xk ∈
X of Xk. Also let ~U = (U0, . . . , UK)′, ~u = (u0, u1, . . . , uK)′, ~ = (0, . . . , K)′, ~x =
(x0,
′
, . . . , xK,
′
)′ and ~X = (X0,
′
, . . . , XK,
′
)′. We start with the social surplus function (or
the expected utility of a representative agent making the multinomial choice decision):
G(~u) = E{max
k
[Uk + k]|~U = ~u}. (3)
Now we introduce the assumption on the error distribution:
Assumption 2.1 (Error Distribution). (a) F~| ~X(·| ~X) = F~(·), where F~| ~X is the condi-
tional distribution of ~ given ~X, and F~ is the marginal distribution of ~, and
(b) F~(·) is continuous everywhere.
(c) The support of ~U is a subset of that of ~.
Remarks. Some words on part (a) of the assumption are worthwhile as it may appear
to be a restrictive assumption. To begin, we stress that it is substantially weaker than
the commonly used independent type-I extreme value (logit) assumption. The main
advantage of part (a) over logit is that it allows arbitrary heterogeneity and dependence
of k across k, which is important to avoid the IIA (independence of irrelevant alternative)
restriction on conditional choice probabilities.
Moreover, relaxing part (a) within our framework can be done in two ways. First,
we can instead use a conditional version F~| ~X,Z(·| ~X,Z) = F ~|ZF (·|Z) given a control
variable/vector Z. Then all our subsequent identification and estimation analysis follows
with the additional conditioning on Z; in particular, the cyclic monotonicity inequality
restrictions (Eqs. (6) and (7) below) derived below will just need to hold with the
additional conditioning event Z = z for all possible values of z. Similar uses of control
variables are common in the treatment effect literature (see e.g. Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983) and Imbens (2004)). Such control variables, if not available in the data, may be
constructed as control functions after imposing a structure on the generation process of
~X, similarly to the non-separable model literature (see e.g. Imbens and Newey (2009)).
Second, part (a) may be weakened to other conditions that guarantee the convexity of
G(~u). For example, we may consider k = gk(Uk, ηk), where (η0, . . . , ηK)′ is independent
of ~X, and gk(·, ηk) is convex for all k and all values of ηk. Fully exploring these extensions
is beyond the scope of this paper, but is the topic of ongoing research. 
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Assumption 2.1 guarantees that G(·) is convex and differentiable in RK+1, and that
the choice probability vector is the gradient of G:
~p(~u) = ∇G(~u), (4)
where ~p(~u) = E(~Y |~U = ~u) with ~Y = (Y 0, . . . , Y K)′ and Y k = 1{Uk + k ≥ U ` +
`, ∀` = 0, . . . , K}. This is developed in the next Lemma, which shows the convexity
and differentiability of G on RK+1, as well as equation (4). The proof of the lemma is
given in the appendix.2
Lemma 1 (Gradient). Suppose that Assumption 2.1 holds. Then
(a) G(·) is convex on RK+1,
(b) G(·) is differentiable on RK+1, and
(c) equation (4) holds.
An immediate corollary of Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 connects cyclic monotonicity
to the multinomial choice probabilities. The proof of the corollary is omitted.
Corollary 1 (Cyclic monotonicity of choice probabilities). Suppose that Assumption 2.1
holds. Then ~p(~u) is cyclic monotone on RK+1, that is for any integer j ≥ 2 and any
length-J cycle ~u1, . . . , ~uJ , ~u1, we have
J∑
j=1
[(~uj+1 − ~uj)′~p(~uj)] ≤ 0 (5)
The cyclic monotonicity of ~p(~u) is the basis of our identification results, which we
discuss in the next section.
2.1 Identification
Let ~X denote the support of ~X. The cyclic monotonicity of ~p(~u) immediately implies
the following identifying inequalities: for any integer J ≥ 2, and any length-J cycle
2Part (c) of the lemma is the well known Williams-Daly-Zachary (WDZ) theorem. See McFadden
(1978, 1981) for discussions and proofs. Our proof of Lemma 1 in the Appendix also includes a self-
contained proof.
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~x1, ~x2, . . . , ~xJ , ~x1 in ~X , we have
J∑
j=1
[
K∑
k=0
(β′xkj+1 − β′xkj )E(Y k| ~X = ~xj)
]
≤ 0, (6)
where ~xj+1 = ~x1 and x
k
j is subvector of ~xj that is composed of the (dxk + 1)th to the
dx(k + 1)th coordinate of ~xj.
Before proceeding, it is useful to simplify the inequalities using the fact that Y 0 =
1−∑Kk=1 Y k. With this equation plugged in, (6) becomes
J∑
j=1
[
K∑
k=1
(β′(xkj+1 − x0j+1)− β′(xkj − x0j))E(Y k| ~X = ~xj)
]
≤ 0, (7)
This suggests that it is without loss of generality to normalize x0 = 0, which we do for
the rest of the paper. In most applications, product 0 is an imaginary “outside option”
and x0 = 0 is explicitly used.3
For each cycle, the inequalities restrict β to a halfspace of Rdx (with boundary passing
through the origin). The inequalities for all cycles thus restrict β to the intersection of
all the halfspaces defined by those cycles. Therefore, our identifying inequalities clearly
restrict β to a strict subset of Rdx ; in other words, they at least partially identify β.
On the other hand, it is clear that the inequalities (6) (or (7)) provide no identifying
information for the scale of β. If the first coordinate of Xk is unity for all k, the in-
equalities are also not informative about the first coordinate of β. Such nonidentification
is innate to the multinomial choice model where the location and the scale of the error
vector ~ are not normalized. In the literature, various ways of normalizations have been
adopted. For our identification and estimation, we find it the most convenient to adopt
the following normalization.
Assumption 2.2 (Normalization). (a) max`=1,...,dx |β`| = 1, where β` is the `th co-
ordintate of β.
(b) For any k = 0, . . . , K, Xk does not contain a unity coordinate.
3 In other applications, all products are inside products and the characteristics for each product are
measured, in which case we can arbitrarily set one product be product 0 and let the xk for product k
be the characteristics of product k minus that of product 0.
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Essentialy, part (a) of this assumption, which is the scale normalization, restricts
attention to vectors β which lie on “the unit square”.
2.1.1 Assumptions for Point Identification
Next, we analyze the further assumptions needed to guarantee point identification given
the normalization. For convenience, we start with the binary choice case, which illustrates
clearly the main argument for point identification. Afterwards we present the general
result of interest, for multinomial choice models.
In the binary choice case, the inequalities (7) can be simplified to4
J∑
j=1
[
(β′x1j+1 − β′x1j)E(Y 1|β′X1 = β′x1j)
] ≤ 0. (8)
That is, the conditional mean function E(Y 1|β′X1 = u) is cyclic monotone in u. Be-
cause this function maps from R to R, cyclic monotonicity is equivalent to monotonicity.
Therefore, the set of identifying inequalities for the binary choice case is simply: for all
x11, x
1
2 ∈ X we have
(β′x12 − β′x11)[E(Y 1|X1 = x12)− E(Y 1|X1 = x11)] ≥ 0. (9)
Let A = {(x12 − x11)[E(Y 1|X1 = x12) − E(Y 1|X1 = x11)] : x12, x11 ∈ X}, and let C
denote the convex cone generated by A, that is,
C =
{
L∑
`=1
λ`a` : a` ∈ A, λ` ∈ [0,∞), for all ` = 1, · · · , L; L = 1, 2, 3 . . .
}
. (10)
While A needs not be convex, C is convex. Hence it can be characterized as the intersec-
tion of all the halfspaces in Rdx which contain C. In this regard, the critical assumption
for point identification of β is that C itself is a halfspace.
Assumption 2.3 (Sufficient and Necessary). The closure of C is a halfspace in Rdx.
Intuitively, if C is not a halfspace, then it is the intersection of at least two distinct
halfspaces with boundary passing through the origin. Let two of these halfspaces be
{a ∈ Rdx : b′1a ≥ 0}, and {a ∈ Rdx : b′2a ≥ 0}. Then because these halfspaces contain
4Recall that x0 is normalized to zero.
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C, we must have b′1a ≥ 0 and b′2a ≥ 0 for all a ∈ A, implying that both b1, b2 satisfy the
inequalities in (9). Hence β is not point identified.
Let ∆X denote the set {x1 − x2 : x1, x2 ∈ X}. A sufficient condition for Assumption
2.3 is that ∆X surrounds the origin from every direction, which is stated concisely in the
assumption below.
Assumption 2.4 (Sufficient). The set {λa : λ ∈ R, λ ≥ 0, a ∈ ∆X} equals Rdx.
Then we have the following result:
Theorem 1 (Point identification - Binary choice). Suppose that Assumption 2.1 holds.
(a) The parameter β is uniquely identified under the normalization Assumption 2.2 if
and only if Assumption 2.3 holds.
(b) Assumption 2.3 holds if Assumption 2.4 holds.
Remarks. (a) Assumption 2.3 is a rather weak assumption because it does not require
any of the covariates to have full support or even to be continuous.
(b) The sufficient condition in Assumption 2.4 rules out discrete regressors (but al-
lows mixed regressors). On the other hand, given that there is no discrete regressor,
Assumption 2.4 is rather weak. One sufficient condition is that the support of each X1
contains a dx-dimensional hypercube of positive volume.
(c) In general, Assumption 2.4 does not rule out deterministic relationships between
covariates. For example, it holds if X1 = (W,W 2)′ for a random variable W and its
square term W 2, as long as the support of W contains an interval (of positive length) on
the real line. 
Next we present our main point identification result, for the multinomial choice case.
The main argument here is a straightforward generalization of the binary choice argument
presented above.
For any integer J ≥ 2, let
A(J) =
{
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
(xkj+1 − xkj )E(Y k| ~X = ~xj) : xkj ∈ X ∀j = 1, . . . , J, xkJ+1 = xk1 ∀k = 1, . . . , K
}
.
(11)
Let A(J¯) = ∪J¯J=2A(J). And let C(J¯) be the convex cone generated by A(J¯). Then
the following condition is necessary and sufficient for point identification based on the
inequalities (7) for all cycles of length at most J¯ . Here J¯ is allowed to be ∞.
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Assumption 2.5 (Sufficient and Necessary). The closure of C(J¯) is a half space in Rdx.
The sufficient condition is based on length-2 cycles and uses the strategies of the
binary choice case. For k∗ ∈ {1, . . . , K}, let X k∗(~x−k∗) be the support set of Xk∗ given
that ~X−k∗ = ~x−k∗ , where ~X−k∗ is ~X with its (dxk∗ + 1)th to (dxk∗ + dx)th elements
removed. Let ∆X k∗(~x−k∗) = X k∗(~x−k∗)−X k∗(~x−k∗).
Assumption 2.6 (Sufficient). There exists k∗ ∈ {1, . . . , K} and a vector ~x−k∗ ∈ (X )dx(K−1)
such that the set {λa : λ ≥ 0, a ∈ ∆X k∗(~x−k∗)} equals Rdx.
Then we have the following result.
Theorem 2 (Point Identification - Multinomial choice). Suppose that Assumption 2.1
holds. (a) The parameter β is uniquely identified by the identifying inequalities (7) for
all cycles of length at most J¯ under the normalization Assumption 2.2, if and only if
Assumption 2.5 holds.
(b) Assumption 2.5 holds with J¯ = 2 if Assumption 2.6 holds.
The proof of part (a) of the theorem is the same as that of Theorem 1(a) and the
proof of part (b) of the theorem is the same as that of Theorem 1(b) once we condition
on the event ~X−k∗ = ~x−k∗ . Thus, the proof of this theorem is omitted.
2.2 Numerical Illustration
In this subsection, we consider two numerical examples to illustrate the identifying power
of cyclical monotonicity. We consider a binary choice model followed by a three-choice
multinomial model.
2.2.1 Binary Choice Model
First, we consider a numerical example for the binary choice model, where the regressors
X1, are a 3-dimensional vector with support X = X1 ×X2 ×X3. The covariate value for
option 0, X0, is normalized to zero.
We generate the data by setting the error term {k}Kk=0 to be independently type 1
extreme-value distributed across both choices, leading to binary logit choice probabilities.
We also set the true value β = (1, 1, 1)′. Using this information, we can precisely compute
E(Y 1|X1 = x1) for given value x1 of X1.
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By the discussion in Section 2.1.1, if we allow X1 to be a continuous random vector
whose support contains a hypercube, the identifying inequalities in (9) point identify β.
But if X1 only takes a finite number of values, the inequalities (9) may only restrict β to
an identified set. Below, we vary the support of X1 to demonstrate how the identification
power of (9) increases as we increase the number of points in the support of X1.
For comparison purpose, we also consider the identification power of the median-
independence condition underlying the maximum score estimator (Manski, 1975). The
identifying restriction of median-independence is described in Section 5 below.
We consider four designs of X :
[A.] X = {0, 0.5, 1}3,
[B.] X = {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}3,
[C.] X = {0, 0.125, 0.25, 0.375, 0.5, 0.625, 0.75, 0.875, 1}3,
[D.] X = {0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1}3.
We normalize β1 = 1, and plot the identified set for (β2, β3). Figure 1 below shows the
identified set defined by the inequalities (9) for all four designs, as well as the identified set
defined by the maximum score identification condition (30). As we can see, the identified
set shrinks rapidly as we increase the density of points in X , and at the most dense design
(Design D), the identified set is numerically indistinguishable from the singleton point
(1, 1).
In contrast, the identified set for the maximum score approach, for all four designs,
remains the entire first quadrant {β1 ≥ 0, β2 ≥ 0}. This is not surprising given that the
maximum score condition is derived under a weaker median-independence assumption.
When its weaker assumption on the error distribution is not accompanied by the full
support of some of the regressors, evidently, identification becomes quite weak, as in this
example.
2.2.2 Multinomial (three choice) Model
Now we consider a multinomial (three choice) model. Each individual’s choice set consists
of three elements k ∈ {0, 1, 2} where choices 1 and 2 are characterized by covariates
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Figure 1: Illustration of Identified Sets in Binary Choice Example. Designs A-D
show the identified set of the cyclic monotonicity inequalities (9) under the four designs specified
in the text. MS shows the identified set of the maximum score identification condition (30),
which is first quadrant for all four designs.
X1 = (X11, X12, X13)
′ and X2 = (X21, X22, X23)′, respectively. The covariate for X0 for
option 0 is normalized to zero.
As in the binary choice model, we consider a multinomial logit specification for the
utility shocks ki . We consider the same four designs as in the binary example, and
normalize β1 to 1. Figure 2 shows the identified set of the inequalities (7) with length-2
cycles for the four designs. As we can see, the identified set shrinks as the points become
dense in the support of Xk, k = 1, 2. At the most dense design, the identified set is
numerically indistinguishable from a singleton point at the true value of β2 = β3 = 1.
5
5Notice that the shape of the identified sets in Figure 2 is not as nice as in Figure 1. This is because
the identified sets for the binary choice model are plotted precisely using all possible cycles. On the
other hand, the number of “all possible cycles” is prohibitively large in the trinary example except in the
most sparse design. Thus, the identified sets plotted in Figure 2 are approximations of the identified set
using a sample of 5000 cycles. To draw the cycle sample, we assume that (X11, X12, X13, X21, X22, X23)
are i.i.d., and each assigns equal probability to its support points. To form a random length-2 cycle, we
draw the two points from the distribution just specified independently, and form the cycle using these
two points.
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Figure 2: Illustration of Identified Sets in Trinary Choice Example. Designs
A-D show the identified set of the cyclic monotonicity inequalities (9) under the four designs
specified in the text.
3 Panel Data Multinomial Choice Models
One notable advantage of the cyclic monotonicity framework is the immediate applica-
bility to panel multinomial choice models with fixed effects. In this section, we start with
the aggregated panel data setting (explained below) because that is the data structure
in our empirical applications. We also discuss the standard individual panel data setting
in order to connect to the broader semi-parametric panel discrete choice literature.
3.1 Aggregated Panel Data
The aggregate panel data structure is often encountered in empirical IO. Typically, the re-
searcher observes the aggregated choice probabilities (or market shares) for the consumer
population in a number of regions and across a number of time periods. Correspondingly,
the covariates are also only observed at region/time level for each choice option. To be
precise, we observe (~Sct, ~Xct)
C
c=1
T
t=1 where ~Xct = (X
0,′
ct , . . . , X
K,′
ct )
′ is the region/time-level
covariate, and ~Sct = (S
0
ct, . . . , S
K
ct )
′, Skct is the fraction of nct agents in region c and time
t who chose option k, i.e.
~Sct = n
−1
ct
nct∑
i=1
~Yict, (12)
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where ~Yict = (Y
0
ict, . . . , Y
K
ict)
′ denotes the vector of choice indicators for individual i in
region c and time t. Only a “short” panel is required, as our approach works with as
few as two periods. Suppose that the support of Xkct for all k, c, t is X ⊆ Rdx , and the
support of ~Xct is ~X .
We model the individual choice ~Yict as
Y kict = 1{β′Xkct + αkc + kict ≥ β′Xk
′
ct + α
k′
c + 
k′
ict ∀k′}. (13)
where ~ac = (a
0
c , . . . , a
K
c )
′ is the choice-specific regional fixed effect, and ~ict = (0ict, . . . , 
K
ict)
′
is the vector of idiosyncratic shocks. We make the following assumptions
Assumption 3.1 (Stationarity). The vector of utility shocks ~ict is identically distributed
across t.
Assumption 3.2 (Contemporaneous Exogeneity). (a) The vector of utility shocks ~ict is
exogenous in the sense of: F~ict| ~Xct,~ac = F~ict.
(b) F~ict(·) is continuous everywhere.
(c) The support of β′Xkct + a
k
c is a subset of that of 
k
ict for all k = 0, . . . , K.
Consider cycles on ~X , the support of ~Xct := (X0,′ct , . . . , XK,
′
ct )
′. We cannot use cycles
on the support of (X0,
′
ct , a
0
c , . . . , X
K,′
ct , a
K
c )
′ because we want to derive inequalities where
the fixed effects ~ac := (a
0
c , . . . , a
K
c )
′ are held constant, so that they can be “differenced”
out. Using Assumption 3.2, for all cycles ~x1, ~x2, . . . , ~xJ , ~x1 ∈ ~X and for all J ≥ 2, we
obtain, for any i, c, t:
J∑
j=1
[
K∑
k=0
(β′xkj+1 − β′xkj )E(Y kict| ~Xct = ~xj,~ac)
]
≤ 0, (14)
where ~xi(J+1) = ~xi1 and x
k
j is the subvector of ~xj that is composed of the (dxk + 1)th to
the dx(k + 1)th coordinate of ~xj.
Further applying Assumption 3.1, we can write (14) equivalently as: for all J ≥ 2,
any length-J cycles of time indices t1, . . . , tJ , tJ+1 ≡ t1 ∈ {1, . . . , T} and any c,
J∑
j=1
[
K∑
k=0
(β′Xktj+1 − β′Xktj)E(Y kictj | ~Xctj ,~ac)
]
≤ 0, a.s. (15)
In aggregated panel data sets, we can expect ~Sct to be a good estimator of E(Y
k
ict| ~Xct,~ac)
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uniformly over c and t. In this case, inequalites (15) (and equivalently (14)) serve directly
as our identifying inequalities even though ~ac is unobserved.
The identifying inequalities (14) are very similar to the general case (6) except that the
choice probability is now conditional on both ~Xct and ~ac. Since these conditional choice
probabilities can be well-estimated directly from the data in the aggregate setting, this
difference does not affect any of the identification results given above. Thus, Theorems
1 and 2 still apply with appropriate notational adjustment.
3.2 Individual Panel Data
In an individual panel data set, we observe (~Yit, ~Xit)
n
i=1
T
t=1 for individual i and time t,
where ~Yit = (Y
0
it , . . . ,
~Y Kit )
′, and ~Xit = X
0,′
it , . . . , X
K,′
it )
′. We model the individual choice
~Yit as
Y kit = 1{β′Xkit + aki + kit ≥ β′Xk
′
it + a
k′
i + 
k′
it ; ∀k′} (16)
where kit, k = 0, . . . , K are the idiosyncratic shocks. In the individual-level dataset, the
fixed effects aki are choice- and individual-specific effects. This is an important difference
vis-a-vis the agrgegate model in the previous section, where the akc are choice- and region-
specific fixed effects.
Analogously to the aggregated panel data setting above, we obtain the following
inequalities: for any integer J ≥ 2, and any length-J cycle ~x1, ~x2, . . . , ~xJ , ~x1 ∈ ~X , we
have, for any i, t,
J∑
j=1
[
K∑
k=0
(β′xkj+1 − β′xkj )E(Y kit | ~Xit = ~xj,~ai)
]
≤ 0, (17)
where ~xi(J+1) = ~xi1 and x
k
j is the subvector of ~xj that is composed of the (dxk + 1)th to
the dx(k + 1)th coordinate of ~xj.
The difficulty with individual-level data is that the data do not provide a consistent
estimator for the individual-specific conditional choice probabilities E(Y kit | ~Xit = ~xj,~ai).
This is a critical difference vis-a-vis the aggregate-level data case; here, since we only
observe several choices per individual, we cannot “difference out” the individual-specific
fixed effect. Hence we proceed by making stronger stochastic assumptions which enable
us to “integrate out” the fixed effects:
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Assumption 3.3 (Stationarity). The vector of utility shocks ~it is identically distributed
across t.
Assumption 3.4 (Strict exogeneity). (a) The vector of utility shocks ~it is strictly ex-
ogenous in the sense of: (~it)
T
t=1 ⊥ ( ~Xit)Tt=1,~ai .
(b) F~it(·) is continuous everywhere.
(c) The support of β′Xkit + a
k
i is a subset of that of 
k for all k = 0, . . . , K.
Remarks. (a) The stationarity assumption and the strict exogeneity assumption to-
gether imply Manski’s (1987) and Pakes and Porter’s (2013) conditional homogeneity
assumption, and in fact is the leading sufficient condition mentioned in the latter. The
strict exogeneity condition is stronger than the contemporaneous exogeneity required for
in the aggregated panel setting, and is needed here for integrating out the fixed effect in
the identifying conditions.
(b) We allow the endogeneity of the covariates in the form of correlation between
X and the unobserved fixed effect because the dependence between ~ai and { ~Xit}t is
unrestricted. 
To see how the stronger assumptions help, note that Assumption 3.3 implies, for all
t,
E(~Yit| ~Xit = ~x,~ai) = E(~Yi1| ~Xi1 = ~x,~ai). (18)
Thus, the inequalities (17) can be written as
J∑
j=1
[
K∑
k=0
(β′xkj+1 − β′xkj )E(Y kitj | ~Xitj = ~xj,~ai)
]
≤ 0, (19)
where {t1, . . . , tJ} is the set of distinct time indices. Also, Assumption 3.4 implies that
E(Y kitj | ~Xitj = ~xj,~ai) = E(Yitj | ~Xit1 , . . . , ~Xitj−1 , ~Xitj = ~xj, ~Xitj+1 , . . . , ~XitJ ,~ai). Therefore,
(19) can be written as
J∑
j=1
[
K∑
k=0
(β′xkj+1 − β′xkj )E(Y kitj | ~Xit1 = ~x1, . . . , ~XitJ = ~xJ ,~ai)
]
≤ 0. (20)
Now taking conditional expectations over the distribution of ~ai given ~Xit1 , . . . , ~XitJ on
both sides of the above inequalities, we obtain for all J ≥ 2 and any length-J cycle of
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time indices t1, . . . , tJ , tJ+1 ≡ t1,
J∑
j=1
[
K∑
k=0
(β′Xktj+1 − β′Xktj)E(Y kitj | ~Xit1 , . . . , ~XitJ )
]
≤ 0, a.s. (21)
Therefore, in the panel data setting with individual data, our identifying conditions are
inequalities in (21).
4 Estimation and Inference
4.1 Cross-sectional Case
In this subsection, we assume that β is point identified based on the inequalities Eq. (6)
constructed using cycles of length at most J¯ .
We have a data set {( ~Xi, ~Yi)}ni=1. Based on this data set, suppose that there is a
uniformly consistent estimator pˆk(~x) for E(Y k| ~X = ~x) for all k; for example, this can be
a kernel regression estimator. Then a consistent estimator of β can be obtained as
β̂ = arg min
b=(b1,...,bdx )
′:
max`=1,...,dx |b`|=1
Qn(b), (22)
where
Qn(b) = max
J=2,...,J¯
max
1≤i1,...,iJ≤n
iJ+1=i1
[
J−1
∑J
j=1
∑K
k=0(b
′Xkij+1 − b′Xkij)pˆk( ~Xij)
maxj=1,...,J,k=0,...,K ‖Xkij‖
]
+
, (23)
where [a]+ = max{0, a}. The weight maxj=1,...,J,k=0,...,K ‖Xkij‖ is used to normalize the
scale of Xkj ’s in each cycle. It allows the consistency result to be shown without assuming
that X is a bounded set. If X indeed is bounded, then removing the weight does not
affect consistency.
Let the population version of Qn(b) be
Q(b) = max
J=2,...,J¯
sup
~x1,...,~xJ∈ ~X
[
J−1
∑J
j=1
∑K
k=0(b
′xkj+1 − b′xkj )E(Y k| ~X = ~xj)
maxj=1,...,J,k=0,...,K ‖xkj‖
]
+
(24)
The following theorem shows the consistency of β̂.
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Theorem 3 (Consistency). Suppose that the following conditions hold:
(i) Q(b) is uniquely minimized at b = β.
(ii) sup~x∈ ~X
∑K
k=1 |pˆk(~x)− E(Y k| ~X = ~x)| →p 0 as n→∞.
(iii) pk(~x) ≡ E(Y k| ~X = ~x) is continuous in ~x on ~X .
Then, we have β̂ →p β.
While we have derived consistency for the estimator, calculations for the limit distri-
butions are difficult, due to the “one-sided” nature of the objective function. We leave
it for future work.
4.2 Individual Panel Data
In this subsection, we consider a panel data set { ~Xit, ~Yit)}ni=1Tt=1, and let β be point
identified based on the inequalities Eq. (21) constructed using cycles of length up to J¯ .
Assume that we have a short panel, that is, in the asymptotic analysis, T is fixed
and n → ∞. Based on the panel data set, suppose that there is a uniformly consistent
estimator pˆktj |t1,...,tJ (~x1, . . . , ~xJ) for E(Y
k
itj
| ~Xit1 = ~x1, . . . , ~XitJ = ~xJ) for all k, all j =
1, . . . , J , and all t1, . . . , tJ . For example, this can be a kernel regression estimator. Then
a consistent estimator of β can be obtained as
β̂ = arg min
b=(b1,...,bdx )
′:max` |b`|=1
Qn(b), where Qn(b) = (25)
max
J=2,...,J¯
max
1≤t1,...,tJ≤T,
tJ+1=t1
max
1≤i≤n
[
J−1
∑J
j=1
∑K
k=0(b
′Xkitj+1 − b′Xkitj)pˆktj |t1,...,tJ ( ~Xit1 , . . . , ~XitJ )
maxj=1,...,J ;k=0,...,K ‖Xkitj‖
]
+
(26)
The estimator is consistent by similar arguments as those for Theorem 3 given that the fol-
lowing conditions hold: (i) the inequalities (21) with J = 2, . . . , J¯ together point identify
β; (ii) sup~xj′∈ ~X ∀j′=1,...,J
∑K
k=1 |pˆktj |t1,...,tJ (~x1, . . . , ~xJ) − E(Y kitj | ~Xit1 = ~x1, . . . , ~XitJ )| →p 0
as n → ∞ for all j = 1, . . . , J , all t1, . . . , tJ ∈ {1, . . . , T}, and all J = 2, . . . , J¯ ; and
(iii) E(Y kitj | ~Xit1 = ·, . . . , ~XitJ = ·) is continuous for all k = 0, . . . , K, all j = 1, . . . , J , all
t1, . . . , tJ ∈ {1, . . . , T}, and all J = 2, . . . , J¯ .
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For the same reason as the previous subsection, we leave the limiting distribution of
β̂ for future research.
4.3 Aggregated Panel Data
When an aggregated panel data set like that discussed in Section 3.1 is available, es-
timating the conditional choice probability is easier. This is because, we can use ~Sct
to estimate E(~Yict| ~Xct,~ac). If infc,t nct grows fast enough with C × T , this estimator is
uniformly consistent, i.e.
sup
c
sup
t
sup
J
sup
t1,...,tJ≤T
‖~Sct − E(~Yict| ~Xct,~ac)‖ →p 0. (27)
Section 3.2 of Freyberger’s (2013) arguments (using Bernstein’s Inequality) imply that
the above convergence holds if log(C × T )/minc,t nct → 0.
Given this, we can define the consistent estimator of β as
β̂ = arg min
b:max` |b`|=1
Qn(b), (28)
where
Qn(b) = max
J=2,....,J¯
max
c=1,...,C
max
1≤t1,...,tJ≤T,
tJ+1=t1
[
J−1
∑J
j=1
∑K
k=0(b
′Xkctj+1 − b′Xkctj)Skctj
maxj=1,...,J,k=0,...,K ‖Xkctj‖
]
+
. (29)
This estimator is consistent by similar arguments as those for Theorem 3 if (i) the iden-
tifying inequalities (15) for J = 2, . . . , J¯ point identify β, (ii) log(C × T )/minc,t nct → 0,
and (iii) E(~Yict| ~Xct = x,~ac) is continuous in x almost surely for all c, t.
Note that the criterion function Qn(b) is a convex function of b in all three data
environments. Obtaining a global minima of the convex function over a convex set
typically is easy. This is why we use the normalization max` |b`| = 1 instead of the
perhaps more familiar normalization ‖b‖ = 1 in Assumption 2.2(a). Even though {b :
max` |b`| = 1} is not a convex set, it can be written as the union of 2dx convex sets:
{b : b1 = 1}, {b : b1 = −1}, . . . , {b : bdx = 1}, {b : bdx = −1}. Thus, obtaining β̂ amounts
to solving 2dx convex problems, which is more convenient in practice than solving a non
convex problem with unknown numbers of local minima.
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Throughout this section, we have focused on the estimation under the assumption
that the conditions specified above for point identification are satisfied. In the case that
these conditions are not satisfied, the parameters will only be point identfied, and we
can consider an alternative inferential approach for this case based on recent work by
Freyberger and Horowitz (2013). Since this approach is quite different in spirit to the
methods described so far, we do not discuss it here.6
5 Comparison with Other Approaches
In this section, we compare our approach to other approaches to semi-parametric dis-
crete choice models. Our approach relies on an assumption of independence between
(0, . . . , K) and (X0, . . . , XK). For the special case of binary choice, our independence
assumption is stronger than the median-independence assumption underlying the max-
imum score approach in Manski (1975, 1988). In maximum score, it is assumed that
med(|X) = med() = 0, which implies the maximum score identification condition:
E(Y 1|X1 = x1) ≥ 0.5⇔ β′x1 ≥ 0, ∀x1 ∈ X . (30)
Suppose that the normalization med() = 0 is also used (instead of Assumption 2.2(b)).
Then (30) is the cyclic monotnonicity applied to the cycles of the form x1, 0, x1. Our
identifying inequalities use all cycles, and thus provides more restriction on the parame-
ter.7
Still in the binary choice case, the cyclical monotonicity conditions are equivalent to
the identification conditions implied by Han’s (1987) monotone single index assumption.
In fact, the identification inequalities (9) can be derived from Han’s assumptions instead
of the full independence assumptions that we are making. The former allows certain
forms of heteroskedasticity. Nonetheless, we establish different point identification con-
ditions than Han (1987) and propose a different estimator. Moreover, Han’s approach
only applies to binary choice; indeed, since cyclic monotonicity is one generalization
of monotonicity to a multivariate setting, our approach may be considered one way of
generalizing Han’s estimator to the multinomial case.
6 Please contact the authors for more details and empirical illustrations of this alternative approach.
7To supplement the median-independence assumption, the maximum score approach imposes some
of the regressors to have full support in order to achieve point identification. As the numerical example
in Section 2.2.1 illustrated, our approach has more identifying power than the maximum score approach
when these support conditions are not satisfied.
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The maximum score approach can be applied to multinomial choice models, un-
der an additional symmetry (exchangeability) assumption on the joint distribution of ~
(e.g. Manski (1975), Fox (2007), Yan (2013)). Our independence assumption is neither
stronger nor weaker than the symmetry assumption. Furthermore, our approach does
not rely on large support for any of the covariates, does not impose a rank-order property
between choice probabilities and utility indices, nor require that the sign of an coordinate
of β is known, unlike some existing strategies for multinomial choice models (e.g., Lewbel
(2000), Fox (2007)).
Klein and Spady (1993) provide a maximum likelihood based approach for semi-
parametric binary choice models. Ichimura and Lee (1991), Lee (1995), as well as Ai’s
(1997) general semi-parametric likelihood approach may be applied to the estimation of
a multinomial choice model like ours. However, it does not seem easy to extend the
maximum likelihood approach to a panel data setting. Moreover, our approach involves
solving convex minimization problems and thus has some computational advantage.
The literature on panel discrete choice models is smaller. Manski (1987), Honore´
and Kyriazidou (2000) and Honore´ and Lewbel (2002) propose alternative approaches
for the binary choice model. These approaches do not immediately apply to multinomial
models. Moreover, they impose various shape support assumptions on the covariates. On
the other hand, we impose no restriction on the dependence between the covariates and
the fixed effects, and do not require the presence of a special regressor that is conditionally
independent of the fixed effects.
For panel data multinomial choice models, the on-going work of Pakes and Porter
(2013) proposes a different nonlinear differencing approach. Since this is the only other
approach available for the panel data setting with individual fixed effects for multinomial
models, we describe it briefly here for comparison purpose. Pakes and Porter (2013) take
a pair of time periods (t, s), and consider the difference
δi(t,s)(β) := ~Uit − ~Uis ≡ (0, β′(X1it −X1is), · · · , β′(XKit −XKis ))′. (31)
Then they rearrange the K + 1 coordinates of δi(t,s)(β) in descending order. Suppose
that k(0, β), · · · , k(K, β) are respectively the index of the largest, second largest, . . . ,
(K + 1)th largest coordinates of δi(t,s)(β). They show that for all ` ∈ {0, · · · , K}, the
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following inequality holds
E
[∑`
v=0
(Y
k(v,β)
it − Y k(v,β)is )
∣∣∣∣∣ ~Xit, ~Xis
]
≥ 0. (32)
The difference between Eq. (21), which underlies our moment inequalities, and Eq. (32),
which encapsulates the Pakes and Porter approach, is apparent. Neither set of moment
inequalities nests the other. One obvious feature of our moment inequalities is that the
linearity in β is preserved, which may simplify the estimation and inference.
6 Empirical Illustration
Here we consider an empirical illustration. We estimate a discrete choice demand model
for toilet tissue, using store/week-level scanner data from different branches of Dominicks
supermarket.8 The toilet tissue category is convenient because there are relatively few
brands of toilet paper, which simplifies the analysis. The data are collected at the store
and week level, and report sales and prices of different brands of toilet tissue. For each
of 54 Dominicks stores, we aggregate the store-level sales of toilet tissue up to the largest
six brands, lumping the remaining brands into the seventh good (see Table 1).
Table 1: Table of the 7 product-aggregates used in estimation.
Products included in analysis
1 Charmin
2 White Cloud
3 Dominicks
4 Northern
5 Scott
6 Cottonelle
7 Other good (incl. Angelsoft, Kleenex, Coronet and smaller brands)
We estimate a panel version of the multinomial choice model, forming moment con-
ditions based on cycles over weeks, for each store. In the estimation results below, we
consider cycles of length 2.9 Since data are observed at the weekly level, we consider
subsamples of 5 weeks, 10 weeks or 15 weeks which were drawn at periodic intervals
from the 1989-1993 sample period. After the specific weeks are drawn, all length-2 cycles
8This dataset has previously been used in many papers in both economics and marketing; see a partial
list at http://research.chicagobooth.edu/kilts/marketing-databases/dominicks/papers.
9We find that using cycles of length up to 3 or 4 gives exactly the same estimates.
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that can be formed from those weeks are used. In the estimation, the normalization in
Assumption 2.2 is used; thus, no sign assumption is used for any coefficient. All signs
are estimated from the data.
We allow for store/brand level fixed effects and use the techniques developed in Section
3.1 to difference them out. Due to this, any time-invariant brand- or store-level variables
will be subsumed into the fixed effect, leaving only explanatory covariates which vary
both across stores and time. As such, we consider a simple specification with Xk =
(PRICE, DEAL, PRICE*DEAL). PRICE is measured in dollars per roll of toilet tissue,
while DEAL is defined as whether a given brand was on sale in a given store-week.10 Since
any price discounts during a sale will be captured in the PRICE variable itself, DEAL
captures any additional effects that a sale has on behavior, beyond price. Summary
statistics for these variables are reported in Table 3.
The point estimates are reported in Table 2. One robust observation from the ta-
ble is that the sign of the interaction term is positive, indicating that consumers are
less sensitive to price when a product is red-tagged. This may be consistent with a
“bounded-rationality” view of consumer behavior, whereby consumers may be less aware
of a product’s exact price once they are aware that it is on sale.
Table 2: Point Estimates for Demand Application
5 week data 10 week data 15 week data
β1 deal .0267 .0294 -.0707
β2 price -1 -1 -1
β3 price*deal .0431 .0011 .1969
To compare the relative magnitude of the effects of PRICE and DEAL, consider the
results using the 5-week data, and consider a product that has the highest price (about
$0.6, see Table 3) and is not on sale. The results imply that toggling DEAL from zero to
one has the same effect on utility as a price drop of $0.0533 (= 0.0267 + 0.0431 ∗ 0.6162),
which is 0.626 of the standard deviation in price. The corresponding numbers are $0.0301
(or 0.3434 standard deviation), and $0.0514 (or 0.5792 standard deviation) using the 10-
week and the 15-week data results, respectively. These are small numbers, and suggest
10The variable DEAL takes the binary values {0, 1} for products 1-6, but takes continuous values
between 0 and 1 for product 7. The continuous values for product 7 stand for the average on-sale
frequency of all the small brands included in the product-aggregate 7. This and the fact that PRICE
is a continuous variable make Assumption 2.6, which ensures point identification, plausible for this
example.
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that deal status is relatively unimportant, as compared to price, in its effect on consumer
behavior.
Table 3: Summary Statistics
min max mean median std.dev
5 week data DEAL 0 1 0.4394 0 0.4831
PRICE 0.1776 0.6162 0.3686 0.3625 0.0851
10 week data DEAL 0 1 0.4350 0 0.4749
PRICE 0.1776 0.6200 0.3637 0.3541 0.0876
15 week data DEAL 0 1 0.4488 0 0.4845
PRICE 0.1849 0.6200 0.3650 0.3532 0.0887
7 Conclusions
In this paper we explored how the notion of cyclic monotonicity can be exploited for the
identification and estimation of multinomial choice models. In these models, the social
surplus (expected maximum utility) function is convex, implying that its gradient, which
corresponds to the choice probabilities, satisfies cyclic monotonicity. This is just the
appropriate generalization of the fact that the slope of a single-variate convex function
is non-decreasing.
In ongoing work, we are considering the possible extension of these ideas to other
models and economic settings. Moreover, in this paper we have mainly focused on esti-
mation for the case when the researcher has aggregate panel data on choice probabilities;
we also plan to explore estimation when only individual-level panel or cross-sectional
data are available.
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Proof. [Proof of Lemma 1]
(a) By Assumption 2.1(a), we have
G(~u) = E{max
k
[Uk + k]|~U = ~u}. (33)
This function is convex because maxk[u
k + k] is convex for all values of k and the expectation
operator is linear.
(b,c) Without loss of generality, we focus on the differentiability with respect to uK .
Let (u0∗, . . . , uK∗ ) denote an arbitrary fixed value of (U0, . . . , UK). It suffices to show that
limη→0[G(u0∗, u1∗, . . . , uK∗ + η) − G(u0∗, u1∗, . . . , uK∗ )]/η exists. We show this using the bounded
convergence theorem. First observe that
G(u0∗, . . . , uK∗ + η)− G(u0∗, . . . , uK∗ )
η
= E
[
∆(η, ~u∗,~)
η
]
, (34)
where ∆(η, ~u∗,~) = max{u0∗+ 0, u1∗+ 1, . . . , uK∗ +η+ K}−max{u0∗+ 0, u1∗+ 1, . . . , uK∗ + K}.
Consider an arbitrary value ~e of ~. If eK + uK∗ > maxk=0,...,K−1[uk∗ + ek], for η close enough to
zero, we have
∆(η, ~u∗, ~e∗)/η = [(uK∗ + η + e
K)− (uK∗ + eK)]/η = 1. (35)
Thus,
lim
η→0
∆(η, ~u∗, ~e)
η
= 1. (36)
On the other hand, if eK + uK∗ < maxk=0,...,K−1[uk∗ + ek], then for η close enough to zero, we
have
∆(η, ~u∗, ~e∗)/η = [0]/η = 0. (37)
Thus,
lim
η→0
∆(η, ~u∗, ~e)
η
= 0. (38)
By Assumption 2.1(b), we have Pr(K + uK∗ = maxk=0,...,K−1[uk∗ + k]) = 0. Therefore, almost
surely,
lim
η→0
∆(η, ~u∗,~)
η
= 1{K + uK∗ > max
k=0,...,K−1
[uk∗ + 
k]}. (39)
Also, observe that∣∣∣∣∆(η, ~u∗,~)η
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣uK∗ + η + K − (uK∗ + K)η
∣∣∣∣ = 1 <∞. (40)
Thus, the bounded convergence theorem applies and yields
lim
η→0
E
[
∆(η, ~u∗,~)
η
]
= E[1{K + uK∗ > max
k=0,...,K−1
[uk∗ + 
k]}] = pK(~u). (41)
This shows both part (b) and part (c).
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Proof. [Proof of Theorem 1] For both part (a) and part (b), the following fact is useful:
C ⊆ H(β) := {c ∈ Rdx : β′c ≥ 0}. (42)
This is a fact because by the definition of C, for every c ∈ C, we have β′c ≥ 0.
(a) Now we show the sufficiency. Assumption 2.3 implies that there exists a unique b∗ ∈ Rdx
such that C = {c ∈ Rdx : b′∗c ≥ 0}. It suffices to show that β = b∗, or in other words, C = H(β).
Suppose not. Then, there must exsits c∗ ∈ H(β) such that c∗ /∈ C. In other words, c∗ satisfies
b′∗c∗ < 0 and β′c∗ ≥ 0. Because β 6= 0 (by Assumption 2.2(a)), there exists a small purturbation
ε to c∗ such that β′(c∗ + ε) > 0 and b′∗(c∗ + ε) < 0. Let c∗∗ = −(c∗ + ε). Then β′c∗∗ < 0 and
b′∗c∗∗ > 0, or in other words, c∗∗ ∈ C and c∗∗ /∈ H(β). This contradicts (42). Therefore,
C = H(β) and hence β is uniquely identified as the b∗ that defines the half-space that C is.
Next we show the necessity. By definition, C is a pointed convex cone in Rdx . Every pointed
convex cone is the intersection of all half-spaces (of the shape H(b) := {c ∈ Rdx : b′c ≥ 0}
for some b ∈ Rdx) containing the cone. Suppose that Assumption 2.3 does not hold. Then
C 6= H(β). Then there exists at least a b∗ 6= β such that C ⊆ H(β) ∩H(b∗). Because A ⊆ C,
we have A ⊆ H(b∗). That is, the identifying inequalities (9) are satisfied with β replaced by b∗
as well. Thus, β∗ is not uniquely identified by those inequalities. This shows the necessity.
(b) It suffices to show that C = H(β) because H(β) is a half-space. Let c∗ be an arbitrary
point in the interior of H(β). By Assumption 2.4, it must be the case that there exists λ∗ > 0,
and x11∗, x12∗ ∈ X such that c∗ = λ∗(x12∗ − x11∗) and β′(x12∗ − x11∗) > 0.
Assumption 2.1(a) implies that E(Y 1|X1 = x1) = Pr(1−0) > −β′x1) = 1−F1−0(−β′x1).
This and Assumption 2.1(c) together imply that E(Y 1|X1 = x1) is strictly increasing in β′x1.
Thus, we have E(Y 1|X1 = x12∗) − E(Y 1|X1 = x11∗) > 0. Let b∗ denote E(Y 1|X1 = x12∗) −
E(Y 1|X1 = x11∗). Then
c∗ = b−1∗ λ∗ × (x12∗ − x11∗)[E(Y 1|X1 = x12∗)− E(Y 1|X1 = x11∗)]. (43)
Because b−1∗ λ∗ > 0 and because (x12∗ − x11∗)[E(Y 1|X1 = x12∗)− E(Y 1|X1 = x11∗)] ∈ A, we have
c∗ ∈ C. This shows that
H(β) ⊆ C. (44)
This combined with (42) implies that C = H(β).
Proof. [Proof of Theorem 3] Below we show that
sup
b=(b1,...,bdx )
′:max` |b`|=1
|Q(b)−Qn(b)| →p 0. (45)
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Given (45), consider the following standard consistency derivation: for an arbitrary ε > 0,
Pr(‖β̂ − β‖ > ) ≤ Pr(Q(β̂)−Q(β) > δ(ε))
= Pr(Q(β̂)−Qn(β̂) +Qn(β̂)−Qn(β) +Qn(β)−Q(β) > δ(ε))
≤ Pr(Q(β̂)−Qn(β̂) +Qn(β)−Q(β) > δ(ε))
≤ Pr
2 sup
b=(b1,...,bdx )
′:
max` |b`|=1
|Qn(b)−Q(b)| > δ(ε)

→ 0, (46)
where the first inequality holds for some δ(ε) > 0 by condition (i), the continuity of Q(b) and
the compactness of {b = (b1, . . . , bdx)′ : max` |b`| = 1}, the second inequality holds because
Qn(β̂) ≤ Qn(β), and the convergence holds by (45). This shows the theorem.
Now we show (45). First we show the stochastic equicontinuity of Qn(b). Consider the
following derivation:
|Qn(b)−Qn(b∗)|
≤ max
J=2,...,J¯
max
1≤i1,...,iJ≤n,
iJ+1=i1
∣∣∣∣∣(b− b∗)′J
−1∑J
j=1
∑K
k=0(X
k
ij+1
−Xkij )pˆk( ~Xij )
maxj=1,...,J,k=0,...,K ‖Xkij‖
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ max
J=2,...,J¯
max
1≤i1,...,iJ≤n,
iJ+1=i1
‖b− b∗‖J−1
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=0
‖Xkij+1 −Xkij‖
maxj=1,...,J,k=0,...,K ‖Xkij‖
pˆk( ~Xij )
≤ 2(K + 1)‖b− b∗‖. (47)
Therefore,
lim
δ→0
sup
b,b∗:‖b−b∗‖≤δ
|Qn(b)−Qn(b∗)| ≤ lim
δ→0
2(K + 1)δ = 0 a.s. (48)
Given the stochastic equicontinuity (48) and the compactness of {b = (b1, . . . , bdx)′ :
max` |b`| = 1}, to show (45), it suffices to show that for all b = (b1, . . . , bdx)′ : max` |b`| = 1, we
have
Qn(b)→p Q(b). (49)
For this purpose, we let pk(~x) = E(Y k| ~X = ~x), and let
Q˜n(b) = max
J=2,...,J¯
max
1≤i1,...,iJ≤n,
iJ+1=i1
[
J−1
∑J
j=1
∑K
k=0(b
′Xkij+1 − b′Xkij )pk( ~Xij )
maxj=1,...,J,k=0,...,K ‖Xkij‖
]
+
(50)
By condition (iii), we have Q˜n(b)→p Q(b). Now we only need to show that |Q˜n(b)−Qn(b)| →p 0.
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Consider the following derivation:
|Q˜n(b)−Qn(b)|
≤ max
J=2,...,J¯
max
1≤i1,...,iJ≤n,
iJ+1=i1
[
J−1
∑J
j=1
∑K
k=0 |b′Xkij+1 − b′Xkij | × |pk( ~Xij )− pˆk( ~Xij )|
maxj=1,...,J,k=0,...,K ‖Xkij‖
]
≤ max
~x∈ ~X
(2(K + 1)‖b‖) |pk(~x)− pˆk(~x)|
→p 0, (51)
where the convergence holds by condition (ii).
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